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Introduction
In its decisions of 6 November 2019 (‘Right to be forgotten I’ and 
‘Right to be forgotten II’)1, the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(FCC) went so far as to redefine its relationship of cooperation with 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the area of fundamental rights. 
From the German perspective, the significance of the decision cannot 
be underestimated. Contrary to its previous stance, which was largely 
determined by the ‘Solange II’ decision2 and confirmed by subsequent 
case law3, the FCC recognised the Union’s fundamental rights as appeal-
able by constitutional complaint, as laid down in Article 93(1) No. 4a 
of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz)4. The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
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1 FCC, decision of 6 XI 2019, 1 BvR 16/13 – Right to be Forgotten I and FCC, decision 
of 6 XI 2019, 1 BvR 276/17 – Right to be Forgotten II.
2 FCC, decision of 22 X 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339 – Solange II.
3 FCC, decision of 07 VI 2000, 2 BvL 1/97, BVerfGE 102, 147 – Europäische Bananen-
marktordnung.
4 According to Art. 93(1)(4a) Basic Law: The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule 
on constitutional complaints, which may be filed by any person alleging that one of his 
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of the European Union5 is now a relevant standard of review for the 
FCC. This new approach involves risks and opportunities, since both 
the ECJ and the FCC have always used fundamental rights to determine 
their jurisdictional powers.6 Prior to these decisions, the applicability 
of the Union’s fundamental rights meant that the FCC did not exercise 
its jurisdictional power. The reason was that the application of such 
rights – in a manner similar to other Union law – takes precedence 
(Anwendungsvorrang)7 over the Basic Law. The fundamental rights of 
the Union were thus solely a matter for the ECJ. By including them 
in its own review standards, the FCC now applies the fundamental 
rights of the Union and is becoming an actor to be reckoned with in 
that area. This article explains the current approach and highlights the 
relevant changes. Our focus is not so much on a historical analysis of 
the case-law as on the relevant aspects of constitutional law and Union 
law. Consequently, the first step will be to present the previous system, 
including the precedence of application of Union law and its exceptions 
from the FCC perspective (I.), as well as the controversial question of 
the interpretation of Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights8, 
which is decisive for the applicability of the fundamental rights under 
basic rights or one of his rights under paragraph (4) of Article 20 or under Article 33, 38, 
101, 103 or 104 has been infringed by public authority.
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany in the revised version published in 
the Federal Law Gazette Part III, classification number 100-1, as last amended by Article 1 
of the Act of 28 March 2019 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 404).
5 Official Journal of the European Union, C 326/391. 
6 ECJ, judgement of 26 II 2013, Cs. C-617/10 – Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, 
para. 21; ECJ, judgement of 30 IV 2014, Cs. C-390/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:281 – Pfleger and 
Others, para. 34; FCC, decision of 15 I 1958, 1 BvR 400/51, BVerfGE 7, 198 – Lüth; FCC, 
decision of 16 I 1957, 1 BvR 253/56, BVerfGE 6, 32 – Elfes; FCC, decision of 25 II 1975, 
1 BvF 1-6/74, BVerfGE 39, 1 – Schwangerschaftsabbruch I; FCC, decision of 28 V 1993, 
2 BvF 2/90, 4/90 and 5/92, BVerfGE 88, 203 – Schwangerschaftsabbruch II; FCC, decision 
of 20 IV 2016, 1 BvR 966/09 and 1140/09, BVerfGE 141, 220 – BKA.
7 In this article we use the notion precedence of application instead of supremacy or 
primacy of application, because the FCC uses it in its decision Right to be Forgotten II. However, 
the FCC has also used in previous decisions primacy of application, FCC, decision of 30 VI 
2009, 2 BvE 2/08 and 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08 and 182/09, BVerfGE 123, 
267 – Lissabon.
8 According to Article 51, para. 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: The provi-
sions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due 
regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are 
implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles 
and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers.
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the Charter (II.). Based on this, a presentation of the ‘Right to be forgot-
ten II’ decision will be made, taking into account the new aspects (III.). 
The concluding part provides an overview of the consequences, open 
questions, risks and opportunities of the approach (IV.).
1. The precedence of application and its exceptions  
under the Basic Law
The precedence of Union law is a key concept in the relationship 
between Union law and national law.9 This means that Union law 
must be applied even where it conflicts with national law. From the 
German perspective, precedence of application does not nullify Ger-
man law; the conflicting national provisions remain valid but are not 
applied. The FCC emphasized in its early case-law the independence 
of Community law and recognized its precedence of application over 
national law in principle.10 The FCC ruled that European Economic 
Community (EEC) legislation represented the exercise of supranational 
authority, a notion distinct from national public authority under the 
Basic Law.11 However, the precedence of application of supranational 
law in the area of fundamental rights has repeatedly been the focus of 
FCC case-law (1.). The consideration initially given to the protection 
of fundamental rights later led to the recognition of ultra vires review12 
and identity review13, which constitute a constitutional control mecha-
nism employed by the FCC under narrow conditions for the European 
integration process (2.).
9 Already early in the case law developed by the ECJ: Judgment of the Court of 5 II 
1963, Cs. 26/62 – Van Gend & Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; Judgment of the Court of 15 VII 
1964, Cs. 6/64 – Costa/ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66; Judgment of the Court of 9 III 1978, 
Cs. 106/77 – Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49.
10 FCC, decision of 18 X 1967, 1 BvR 248/63 and 216/67, BVerfGE 22, p. 293 (295 
et seq.) – EWG-Verordnungen. 
11 Ibidem, paras 15–18.
12 FCC, decision of 12 X 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155 – Maas-
tricht; FCC, decision of 21 VI 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13, 2729/13, 2730/13 and 2731/13, 2 BvE 
13/13, BVerfGE 142, 123 – OMT; FCC, decision of 05 V 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, 1651/15, 
2006/15 and 980/16 – PSPP.
13 FCC, decision of 30 VI 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 and 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08 
and 182/09, BVerfGE 123, 267 – Lissabon; FCC, decision of 15 XII 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, 
BVerfGE 140, 317 – Europäischer Haftbefehl.
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1.1. Precedence of application and its meaning in the area 
of fundamental rights
In the area of fundamental rights, the precedence of application was 
the main aspect of the FCC judgements ‘Solange I’14 and ‘Solange II’.15 In 
‘Solange I’ issued in 1974, the FCC reserved the right to check the con-
formity of European Union (EU) provisions against the fundamental 
rights set out in the Basic Law “as long as the integration process has 
not progressed so far that Community law receives a catalogue of funda-
mental rights decided on by a parliament and of settled validity, which 
is adequate in comparison with the catalogue of fundamental rights 
contained in the Basic Law.”16 A possible infringement of fundamental 
rights under the Basic law led to the inapplicability of the provisions of 
Community law. The FCC expressly clarified that a decision on the valid-
ity of Community law is reserved for the ECJ. This approach is entirely 
in line with earlier case-law.17 The main argument in this judgement is 
the need for the protection of such aspects of the German Basic Law 
which define the essential features of the constitution.18 In particular, 
according to the FCC, effective monitoring of fundamental rights by 
the ECJ is necessary but non-existent due to a lack of individual legal 
protection. While this approach forms the basis for the ultra vires review 
and the identity review established in later judgments19, it drew strong 
criticism from within the First Senate20 already in the ‘Solange I’ decision. 
In a dissenting opinion, judges Rupp, Hirsch and Wand charged that Com-
munity law did provide a sufficient legal mechanism for the protection 
of fundamental rights. The ‘Solange II’ decision issued in 1986 is already 
laid out in this dissenting opinion. In it, the FCC stated that since the first 
‘Solange’ decision was issued, “a measure of protection of fundamental 
14 FCC, decision of 29 V 1974, 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271 – Solange I.
15 FCC, decision of 22 X 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, 339 – Solange II.
16 Ibidem; According to the lack of translation of the judgment into English, the 
authors have made their own translation for the purposes of this Article.
17 FCC, decision of 18 X 1967, 1 BvR 248/63 and 216/67, BVerfGE 22, 293 – EWG-Ver-
ordnungen, paras 1–5.
18 FCC, decision of 29 V 1974, 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE 37, 271, p. 280 – Solange I.
19 FCC, decision of 12 X 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155 – Maas-
tricht; FCC, decision of 30 VI 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 and 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08 
and 182/09, BVerfGE 123, 267 – Lissabon.
20 The First Senate is basically responsible for constitutional complaints and funda-
mental rights, whereas the Second Senate is responsible for disputes concerning the 
organisation of the state.
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rights had been established within the sovereign jurisdiction of the 
European Communities which in its conception, substance and man-
ner of implementation is essentially comparable with the standards of 
fundamental rights provided for in the Basic Law.”21
Therefore, the FCC essentially reversed the main argument of the 
first ‘Solange I’ decision issued in 1974. The wording of ‘Solange II’ is as 
follows: “As long as the European Communities […] generally ensure 
effective protection of fundamental rights as against the sovereign pow-
ers of the Communities which is to be regarded as substantially similar 
to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by 
the Constitution […], the FCC will no longer exercise its jurisdiction 
to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation […] 
and it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the 
fundamental rights contained in the Basic Law.”22 Today, the written 
catalogue of fundamental rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
which itself is part of primary law, according to Article 6(1) TEU, and the 
fundamental rights case-law of the ECJ, which is becoming increasingly 
important23, ensure the level of protection required by in Solange II.
Important key considerations regarding the multilevel protection 
of fundamental rights in the EU were included in the Court’s decision 
on the regulation of the Community Banana Market in June 2000. The 
FCC had to decide whether constitutional complaints and submissions 
by courts which assert that fundamental rights laid down in the Basic 
Law have been infringed by secondary European Community Law are 
admissible. It was found inadmissible to file constitutional complaints 
and requests, with general courts under Article 100 of the Basic Law24, 
asking to verify the constitutionality of particular regulations in cases 
21 FCC, decision of 22 X 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, p. 339 (378) – Solange II. 
According to the lack of translation of the judgment into English, the authors has made 
the translation for the purposes of this Article
22 FCC, decision of 22 X 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, p. 339 (340) – Solange II.
23 ECJ, judgement of 21 XII 2016, Cs. C-203/15 – Tele2 Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970.
24 Article 100 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: 
(1) If a court concludes that a law on whose validity its decision depends is uncon-
stitutional, the proceedings shall be stayed, and a decision shall be obtained from the 
Land court with jurisdiction over constitutional disputes where the constitution of a Land 
is held to be violated or from the Federal Constitutional Court where this Basic Law is 
held to be violated. This provision shall also apply where the Basic Law is held to be 
violated by Land law and where a Land law is held to be incompatible with a federal law.
(2) If, in the course of litigation, doubt exists as to whether a rule of international 
law is an integral part of federal law and whether it directly creates rights and duties 
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where the applicant does not claim that the development of Europe-
an law, including the ECJ jurisprudence, has reduced the standard of 
protection of his fundamental rights to a level below the minimum 
specified in the ‘Solange II’ decision. Therefore, a request for examining 
the conformity of the secondary Community legislation against funda-
mental rights under the Basic Law, as well as constitutional complaints 
against such provisions, may be based only on the claim that a legal 
effect has been produced by the insufficient protection of guarantees 
of fundamental rights.
Moreover, the FCC mentioned the 1992 change in its legal position, 
introduced by a new clause implemented into the EU law following 
German reunification. The court stated that Article 23(1) No. 1 of the 
Basic Law25 widened the constitutional court’s jurisdiction regarding 
European integration. According to the FCC, there was no need either 
for the identical protection of individual fundamental rights under the 
Basic Law or for the ECJ to produce identical case law. In order to meet 
the constitutional requirements, it is sufficient that ECJ jurisprudence 
guarantees fundamental rights protection within Community law, which 
corresponds to fundamental rights protection under the Basic Law.26 The 
judgements clearly show the approach of the FCC. The court accepts 
the precedence of application of Union law when Union fundamental 
rights are applicable. However, this only applies as long as the funda-
mental rights of the Union provide a level of protection of fundamental 
rights comparable to that provided by the Basic Law. The protection 
for the individual (Article 25), the court shall obtain a decision from the Federal Con-
stitutional Court.
(3) If the constitutional court of a Land, in interpreting this Basic Law, proposes to 
derogate from a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court or of the constitutional 
court of another Land, it shall obtain a decision from the Federal Constitutional Court.
25 Article 23(1) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: With a view to 
establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the 
development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal 
principles, to the rule of law and to the principle of subsidiarity and that guarantees 
a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic 
Law. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent 
of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in its 
treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic 
Law or make such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject to paragraphs 
(2) and (3) of Article 79.
26 J.A. Frowein, Die Europäisierung des Verfassungsrechts, in: Festschrift für 50. Jahre 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, ed. by P. Badura, H. Dreier, Tübingen 2001, p. 217.
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of fundamental rights does not have to be identical with the fundamental 
rights under the Basic Law in detail, but must correspond in its effec-
tiveness to the German standard. As already stated, this reservation is 
only theoretical in nature because of the level of protection that is now 
available at the Union level.
1.2. The ultra vires review and the identity review
The ultra-vires review and identity review constitute a general prerog-
ative of the Basic Law within the integration process of the European 
Union and in principle mean that Union law does not take precedence 
in its application. The two control mechanisms relate less to the area 
of fundamental rights than to the question of which integration steps 
are covered by the Basic Law. The relationship between ultra vires 
review and identity review is still controversial in German jurispru-
dence.27 According to German constitutional law, ultra vires legislative 
acts are those which are adopted by the European Union without any 
empowerment needed under the principle of conferral laid down in 
Article 5(1) TEU, but which are possible in principle under the Basic 
Law, provided the corresponding competence is transferred.28 
In contrast, the identity review should be defined as a mechanism of 
national constitutional law aimed at restricting the number of critical 
breaches of the constitution through an integration process serving 
a safeguarding and stabilising function against parliamentary liability.29 
27 S. Simon, Grenzen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts im europäischen Integrationsprozess, 
Tübingen 2006, p. 233 et seq.; The main difference is arguably the procedural approach 
and the legal consequence of classifying a Union act as ultra vires. The determination 
of an ultra vires act first requires referral to the ECJ. If, on this basis, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court classifies Union action as ultra vires, the German institutions are obliged 
to work towards ensuring that the Union acts in accordance with its competences. In 
principle, this can also be done by transferring further competences, compare to this 
the FCC decision of 05 V 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, 1651/15, 2006/15 and 980/16 – PSPP.
28 FCC, decision of 12 X 1993, 2 BvR 2134/92 and 2159/92, BVerfGE 89, 155 – Maas-
tricht; FCC, decision of 21 VI 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13, 2729/13, 2730/13 and 2731/13, 2 BvE 
13/13, BVerfGE 142, 123 – OMT; FCC, decision of 05 V 2020, 2 BvR 859/15, 1651/15, 
2006/15 and 980/16 – PSPP; FCC, decision of 30 VII 2019, 2 BvR 1685/14 and 2631/14, 
BVerfGE 151, 202 – Europäische Bankenunion; FCC, decision of 13 II 2020, 2 BvR 739/17 – 
Europäisches Patentgericht.
29 K. Schneider, Der Ultra-vires Maßstab im Außenverfassungsrecht, AöR 2014, 
vol. 139, p. 255 et seq.
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When analysing the legal basis for the identity review, one must refer 
to the FCC decision on the Lisbon Treaty.30 In that judgment, the FCC 
specified the terms of such control, pointing out that it should apply 
when legal protection cannot be obtained at the EU level and the abuse 
of authority is evident. In such cases, the FCC verifies whether actions 
of the EU institutions were performed in accordance with the principle 
of subsidiarity within the limits of authoritative rights granted to them. 
The FCC verifies further whether these acts infringe the constitution-
al identity of the Basic Law, pursuant to Article 23(1), sentence 3, in 
connection with the entrenchment clause in Article 79(3) of the Basic 
Law. The control should be in line with the constitutional principle of 
favourability towards European integration, and therefore it does not 
constitute a breach of the loyal cooperation specified in Article 4(3) TEU.
In turn, the FCC 201031 answered in its ‘Honeywell’ ruling, issued in 
201032, the question whether the European Court of Justice exceeded 
its authority by elaborating on the rules of Union law, i.e. whether it 
acted ultra vires. In the above judgment, the FCC did not consent to the 
full authority of the ECJ in assessing whether a given instrument of EU 
law was issued based on the superior rights granted to the EU, because 
according to the FCC, this would be equivalent to “fully transferring 
the burden of administration of the Treaty bases to the EU institutions.” 
Such a structurally significant shift in the ECJ hierarchy of authority to 
make decisions in individual cases should not be warranted.
In the judgment discussed above, the FCC held that, in addition to 
ultra vires control applied in a way favourable to EU law, the control 
in question is applied by the FCC by way of exception and should be 
used in a narrower way. Due to the fact that in the case of a complaint 
related to exceeding of the authority the scope of the control also cov-
ers the legal view expressed by the ECJ, according to the FCC, it is 
vital to protect both the authority, and the position of the independent 
transnational judicial bodies. “This means, on the one hand, respect 
for the Union’s own methods of justice to which the Court of Justice 
considers itself to be bound and which do justice to the “uniqueness” 
of the Treaties and goals that are inherent to them […]. Secondly, the 
Court of Justice has a right to tolerance of error. It is hence not a matter 
30 FCC, decision of 30 VI 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 and 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08 
and 182/09, BVerfGE 123, p. 267 (353 et seq.) – Lissabon. 
31 FCC, decision of 06 VII 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, BVerfGE 126, 286 – Honeywell.
32 FCC, decision of 06 VII 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, BVerfGE 126, 286 – Honeywell.
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for the Federal Constitutional Court in questions of the interpretation 
of Union law which with a methodical interpretation of the statute can 
lead to different outcomes in the usual legal science discussion frame-
work, to supplant the interpretation of the Court of Justice with an 
interpretation of its own. Interpretations of the bases of the Treaties are 
also to be tolerated which, without a considerable shift in the structure 
of competences, constitute a restriction to individual cases and either 
do not permit impacts on fundamental rights to arise which constitute 
a burden or do not oppose domestic compensation for such burdens.”33
Another significant decision was the ECJ judgment of 2015 on OMT34 
concerning the legality of the bond purchase made by the European 
Central Bank (ECB). It should be noted that in this matter a kind of dia-
logue occurred between the ECJ and the FCC. The application for issuing 
of a prejudicial decision included a direct proposition that the action 
of an EU institution is ultra vires in nature and contradicts the primary 
law. The ECJ did not uphold this proposition. However, it should be 
pointed out that in the judgment of 21 June 2016 on the OMT decision35, 
the FCC developed the criteria for the control of both ultra vires acts, as 
well as acts standing in opposition to constitutional identity.36
Unlike the ultra vires review, the identity review is also applied in 
the area of fundamental rights, albeit under very strict conditions. This 
is because human dignity protected by Article 1(1) of the Basic Law is 
part of the constitutional identity laid down in Article 79.3 of the Basic 
Law. The decision on the European arrest warrant, issued in 201537, 
stated that “the Federal Constitutional Court, by means of the identity 
review, guarantees without reservations and in every individual case 
the protection of fundamental rights indispensable according to Art. 23 
sec. 1 sentence 3 in conjunction with Art. 79 sec. 3 and Art. 1 sec. 1 GG.”38 
33 FCC, decision of 06 VII 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, BVerfGE 126, 286 – Honeywell, para. 66.
34 ECJ, judgement of 16  VI 2015, Cs. C-62/14  – Gauweiler and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400.
35 FCC, decision of 21 VI 2016, 2 BvR 2728/13, 2729/13, 2730/13 and 2731/13, 2 BvE 
13/13, BVerfGE 142, 123 – OMT.
36 M. Bainczyk, Problemy hybrydowej oceny aktów unijnego prawa pochodnego w świetle 
wyroku niemieckiego Federalnego Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 21.06.2016 r. w sprawie decyzji 
OMT [Challenges of the hybrid assessment of the EU secondary legislation in the light 
of the German Federal Constitutional Court judgment of 21 June 2016 on the OMT 
decision], EPS 2017 No. 11, p. 29 et seq.
37 FCC, decision of 15 VII 2015, 2 BvR 2735/14, BVerfGE 140, 317 – Europäischer 
Haftbefehl.
38 Ibidem, para. 49.
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In this specific case, the German authorities were not allowed to comply 
with Italy’s extradition request, because it could not be ensured that the 
court procedure carried out in Italy complied with the requirements of 
Article 1(1) of the Basic Law. However, the court emphasized that the 
ascertainment of a violation of constitutional identity in the context of 
fundamental rights is the absolute exception and can only be approved 
under restrictive conditions.39 At this point, it can be stated that the 
precedence of application of Union law in the area of fundamental 
rights holds true in principle, despite the prerogative of identity review. 
However, as described above, the precedence of application only refers 
to cases where the Union’s fundamental rights are applicable. The an-
swer to this key question is largely determined by the interpretation of 
Article 51.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is disputed be-
tween the ECJ and the FCC and which will be examined in detail below.
2. The interpretation of implementing Union law in the sense 
of Article 51.1 of the EU Charter 
The key issue in the interpretation of Article 51.1 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights is the question of the meaning of the implementa-
tion of Union law. The ECJ and the FCC follow different approaches in 
this respect. This can be explained by the fact that the applicability of the 
respective catalogues of fundamental rights also determines the scope 
of jurisdiction. The ECJ tends to have a broad interpretation.40 In the 
“Åkerberg Fransson” judgement regarding the application of fundamental 
39 Ibidem, paras 34, 50.
40 ECJ, judgement of 14  VI 2017, Cs. C-685/15  – Online Games and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:452, para. 55; ECJ, judgement of 7 IX 2017, Cs. C-177/17 – Demarchi 
Gino, ECLI:EU:C:2017:656, para. 18; ECJ, judgement of 8 XI 2016, Cs. C-243/15 – Le-
soochranárske zoskupenie VLK, ECLI:EU:C:2016:838, para. 51; ECJ, judgement of 5 II 
2015, Cs. C-117/14 – Nisttahuz Poclava, ECLI:EU:C:2015:60, para. 29; ECJ, judgement 
of 22 V 2014, Cs. C-56/13 – Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági, ECLI:EU:C:2014:352, para. 54; 
ECJ, judgement of 8 V 2014, Cs. C-483/12 – Pelckmans Turnhout, ECLI:EU:C:2014:304, 
paras 18 et seq.; ECJ, judgement of 30  IV 2014, Cs. C-390/12  – Pfleger and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:281, para. 34; ECJ, judgement of 27 III 2014, Cs. C-265/13 – Torralbo 
Marcos, ECLI:EU:C:2014:187, para. 29; ECJ, judgement of 28 XI 2013, Cs. C-258/13 – 
Sociedade Agrícola e Imobiliária da Quinta de S. Paio, ECLI:EU:C:2013:810, para. 19; ECJ, 
judgement of 26 IX 2013, Cs. C-418/11 – Texdata Software, ECLI:EU:C:2013:588, para. 72; 
ECJ, judgement of 26 II 2013, Cs. C-617/10 – Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, 
para. 18 et seq.
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rights, the CJEU extended the application of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights. As set out in this judgement, Member states are required to 
observe EU fundamental rights ‘in all situations governed by European 
Union law.’ It is sufficient “if such legislation falls within the scope of 
European Union law”, meaning that it must reference EU provisions. 
The Court decided that “where a court of a Member State is called upon 
to review whether fundamental rights are complied with by a national 
provision or measure which, in a situation where action of the Member 
States is not entirely determined by European Union law, implements 
the latter for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the Charter, national au-
thorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection 
of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for 
by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and 
effectiveness of European Union law are not thereby compromised”41 
[…]. It “has jurisdiction to answer the referred questions and to provide 
all guidance as to interpretation needed in order for the referring court 
to determine whether the national legislation is compatible with the 
new principle laid down in Article 50 of the Charter”.42
In contrast, the FCC pursues a narrower approach, according to 
which it is decisive whether Union law imposes mandatory require-
ments on the member states or leaves room for discretion.43 The FCC 
stated repeatedly in its decision that it will refrain from verifying the 
compatibility of German provisions with the Basic Law in cases when 
they are required in order to meet the requirements of EU law.44 How-
ever, the applicants may still rely on an infringement of fundamental 
rights provided for by the Basic Law insofar as the German legislator 
had discretion to determine their scope, i.e. in all matters not regulated 
by EU law. This means that the fundamental rights under the Basic Law, 
with all their consequences, are applied when there is discretion in im-
plementation. As a result, in this area, German public authority is bound, 
41 Ibidem, para. 29.
42 Ibidem, para. 31.
43 With regard to regulations FCC, decision of 14 X 2008, 1 BvF 4/05, BVerfGE 122, 
p. 1 (20 et seq.) paras 79 et seq.; with regard to directives for example FCC, decision of 
15 XII 2011, 1 BvR 1248/11, BVerfGK 19, 278 paras 27 et seq.; FCC, decision of 19 VII 
2011, 1 BvR 1916/09, BVerfGE 129, 78, paras 88 et seq.; FCC, decision of 02 III 2010, 
1 BvR 256/08, 263/08 and 586/08, BVerfGE 125, 260 – Vorratsdatenspeicherung, paras 185 
et seq.; FCC, decision of 11 III 2008, 1 BvR 256/08, BVerfGE 121, 1, para. 135.
44 For example: A Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on greenhouse gases 
emission certificates of 13 III 2007, 1 BvF 1/05, BVerfGE 118, p. 79 (95).
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according to Article 1(3) of the Basic Law45, by fundamental rights under 
the Basic Law and must respect them. In the event of a possible violation, 
a constitutional complaint pursuant to Article 93(1) No. 4a of the Basic 
Law is admissible and the FCC thus has jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
the FCC does not exercise its jurisdiction in the area where Union law 
does not leave any room for discretion in implementation. In this case, 
German specialised courts must respect the fundamental rights of the 
Union when applying Union law and seek a preliminary ruling from 
the ECJ, as stipulated in Article 267 TFEU, on questions of interpretation. 
However, the FCC supplements the protection of fundamental rights 
at Union level through its case law. Due to the lack of individual legal 
protection outside the narrow limits of an action for annulment under 
Article 263 TFEU, the FCC classifies the ECJ as a lawful judge within 
the meaning of Article 101(1) of the Basic Law46.47 Although Article 
101(1) of the Basic Law itself does not constitute a fundamental right, 
a violation can be invoked by way of a constitutional complaint. So far, 
this approach has meant that a violation of the specialised courts’ duty 
of request under 267 TFEU could be asserted before the FCC and the 
request to the ECJ could be enforced. Here, once again the scepticism 
of the FCC formulated in the ‘Solange I’ decision with regard to the pro-
tection of fundamental rights at Union level is evident.
Nonetheless, it must be noted that the ECJ did not limit the legal 
scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights only to cases where a Mem-
ber State implements EU law, which would match the wording of Article 
51.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The ECJ’s approach is based 
on the aim of ensuring the unity and precedence of Union law against 
any adverse effects of differing national protection of fundamental rights, 
an objective which is legitimate from the point of view of Union law.
45 Article 1.3 Basic Law: The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.
46 Article 101.1 Basic Law: Extraordinary courts shall not be allowed. No one may 
be removed from the jurisdiction of his lawful judge.
47 FCC, decision of 22 X 1986, 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE 73, p. 339 (366 et seq.) – Solange 
II; FCC, decision of 31 V 1990, 2 BvL 12/88 and 13/88, 2 BvR 1436/87, BVerfGE 82, p. 159 
(192) – Absatzfonds; FCC, decision of 06. VII 2010, 2 BvR 2661/06, BVerfGE 126, p. 286 
(315) – Honeywell; FCC, decision of 25 I 2011 – 1 BvR 1741/09, BVerfGE 128, p. 157 (186 
et seq.); FCC, decision of 19 VII 2011, 1 BvR 1916/09, BVerfGE 129, p. 78 (105); FCC, 
decision of 28 I 2014, 2 BvR 1561/12, 1562/12, 1563/12 and 1564/12, BVerfGE 135, 155, 
para. 177; established case-law.
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It should be pointed out here that the FCC has criticised this ECJ 
judgment. In the judgment of 24 April 2013 (Antiterrordateigesetz), it 
stated, among other things, that: “[…]this decision must not be read in 
a way that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endan-
gered the protection and enforcement of the fundamental rights in the 
Member States (Art. 23 sec. 1 sentence 1 of the Basic Law) in a way that 
questioned the identity of the Basic Law’s constitutional order […]. The 
decision must thus not be understood and applied in such a way that 
absolutely any connection of a provision’s subject-matter to the mere-
ly abstract scope of Union law, or merely incidental effects on Union 
law, would be sufficient for binding the Member States by the Union’s 
fundamental rights set forth in the EUCFR […]”.48
At this point it can be noted that up till now the fundamental rights 
of the Charter from the FCC perspective were applicable when Union 
law left no discretion for implementation. In a mirror image, the funda-
mental rights of the Basic Law were then applied when there was room 
for discretion in implementation. Against this background, the decisions 
on the right to be forgotten develop their historical significance.
3. ‘Right to be forgotten I’  
and ‘Right to be forgotten II’ decisions
On 27 November 2019, the German FCC published two decisions: ‘Right 
to be forgotten I’49 and ‘Right to be forgotten II’.50 Both decisions concerned 
the issue of one’s name being found in public reporting of past events. 
The cases provided an opportunity for the FCC to specify the standard 
of constitutional court review regarding the Basic Law’s fundamental 
rights in the context of EU law.51
48 FCC, decision of 24 IV 2013 – 1 BvR 1215/07, BVerfGE 133, 277 – Antiterrordateige-
setz, para. 91. 
49 FCC, decision of 6 XI 2019, 1 BvR 16/13 – Right to be Forgotten I; According to 
the lack of translation of the judgment into English, the authors use the Press Release 
No. 83/2019 of 27 XI 2019: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Pressemitteilungen/EN/2019/bvg19-083.html (accessed: 25 V 2020).
50 FCC, decision of 6 XI 2019, 1 BvR 276/17 – Right to be Forgotten II; According to 
the lack of translation of the judgment into English, the authors use the Press Release 
No. 84/2019 of 27 XI 2019: https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Pressemitteilungen/EN/2019/bvg19-084.html (accessed: 25 V 2020).
51 Point 1 in the Press Release in part key considerations of the Senate.
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It should be emphasized that the right to information, especially to 
data protection, is a legal matter that has been extensively developed in 
the context of Union law. Nevertheless, some freedom is left to the na-
tional legislator on certain issues. These decisions are not only interesting 
with regard to the protection of fundamental rights in the multi-level 
system, but also reveal complex tensions between German and Europe-
an fundamental rights. It should also be noted that both cases address 
the relationship between the right to privacy and freedom of the press.
3.1. Facts of the cases
3.1.1. ‘Right to be forgotten I’ – background
The ‘Right to be forgotten I’ decision was based on a claim by the com-
plainant, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for a crime 
committed in 1981, after which he was released from prison in 2002. 
Various press articles about the crime and the trial had been published 
in the magazine ‘DER SPIEGEL’, available online since 1999. In 2009, 
after learning that the articles were still online, the complainant sent 
a cease-and-desist letter to the defendant without success. Afterwards, 
he lodged an action seeking to enjoin the defendant from propagating 
any information on the crime, containing the complainant’s last name. 
The action was dismissed by the Federal Court of Justice (BGH). The 
complainant filed a constitutional complaint for violation of his general 
personality rights.
3.1.2. ‘Right to be forgotten II’ – background
In January 2010, a segment of the TV show “Panorama” was aired titled 
“Dismissal: the dirty practices of employers”, featuring an interview with 
the complainant in her capacity as CEO of a company. In the broadcast, 
the case of a dismissed employee was presented, and the complainant 
was accused of unfair treatment vis-à-vis that employee. In this case, 
the complainant objected to the display and linking of any segment 
of the TV documentary “Panorama” with the above-mentioned title 
by the search engine Google. The search engine operator refused the 
complainant’s request to remove the TV show from search results. After 
that, the complainant lodged an action that was later dismissed by the 
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Higher Regional Court (Oberlandesgericht). Subsequently, the complain-
ant filed a constitutional complaint asserting a violation of her general 
personality rights and her right to informational self-determination.
3.1.3. Key considerations of the Senate
In the case “Right to be forgotten I,” the First Senate of the FCC applied 
the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law as its standard of 
review. The FCC held that claims for protection against the distribution 
of old press articles by means of an online archive must be reviewed by 
balancing the conflicting interests in fundamental rights. It should be 
noted that the legal dispute falls within the field of application of EU law.52 
But so-called media privilege also covered the challenged propagation of 
press articles, for which EU law grants Member States leeway to design. 
Therefore, the matter could not be decided by EU law alone. Although 
the FCC opted for the application of fundamental rights in this case, the 
reasoning has since changed. The court now recognizes the precedence 
of application of the fundamental rights under the Charter even when 
the German legislature has some discretion in the matter. However, there 
is a presumption that the protection afforded by the Charter is already 
guaranteed by the fundamental rights under the Basic Law, since the 
catalogues of fundamental rights of the Member States and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights share a common tradition of fundamental rights.53 
The common tradition has its foundation in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, which in turn is referred to in Article 6.3 TEU, the pream-
ble of the Charter and Articles 52(3) and 53 EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.54 For the Member States, the ECHR provides ‘a common founda-
tion for the protection of fundamental rights’, which provides ‘a relevant 
guideline for the interpretation of the Charter, drawing on the case-law 
of the ECtHR’.55 Several consequences follow from this. On the one hand, 
the fundamental rights under the Charter become even more important 
for the interpretation of the fundamental rights under the Basic Law. The 
Charter has ‘to be taken into account as an interpretation guideline for 
52 Namely the former Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, now replaced by the 
General Data Protection Regulation, 2016/679.
53 FCC, decision of 6 XI 2019, 1 BvR 16/13 – Right to be Forgotten I, paras 55 et seq.
54 Ibidem, para. 57.
55 Ibidem.
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the understanding of the guarantees of the Basic Law […]’.56 On the other 
hand, the fundamental rights under the Charter are now also applied 
when there is room for discretion in implementation and the Charter sets 
out additional fundamental rights guarantees which have no equivalent 
in the Basic Law.57 This follows from the general acceptance of the prece-
dence of the Charter’s fundamental rights as described above. At the same 
time, this means that in these contexts, a violation of the fundamental 
rights under the Charter is reviewed by the FCC. The main argument 
put forward in the decision is the responsibility with regard to European 
integration (Integrationsverantwortung)58 laid down in Article 23(1) Basic 
Law. The responsibility for integration demands active participation of 
the German constitutional organs in the process of European integration.59 
This means that under the openness to EU law under Art. 23 (1) Basic Law, 
the German state is not relieved of its responsibility in matters for which 
competences have been transferred to the EU. The Federal Constitutional 
Court must therefore, in particular, participate in the development of ef-
fective protection of fundamental rights in the multi-level system. Against 
this background, the FCC highlights that individuals have no direct access 
to the ECJ to assert a violation of EU fundamental rights in cases in which 
the ordinary courts apply EU Law.60 In order to close this gap, the FCC 
elevates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to a standard of review in 
the constitutional complaint procedure. Following this decision, the term 
‘basic rights’ within the meaning of the constitutional complaint under 
Article 93(1) No. 4a of the German Constitution now also includes the 
fundamental rights under the Charter, so that the constitutional complaint 
can be justified on the basis of a possible violation of the fundamental 
rights under the Charter.
The ‘Right to be forgotten II’ case, which concerns a legal dispute 
governed by legislation that is fully harmonized with EU law, refines this 
approach. In this case, the relevant standard of review does not derive 
from German basic rights, but solely from European fundamental rights. 
EU law takes precedence of application over the fundamental rights of 
56 Ibidem, para. 59.
57 Ibidem, paras 69 et seq.
58 FCC, decision of 30 VI 2009, 2 BvE 2/08 and 5/08, 2 BvR 1010/08, 1022/08, 1259/08 
and 182/09, BVerfGE 123, p. 267 (351 et seq.) – Lissabon.
59 FCC, decision of 6 XI 2019, 1 BvR 276/17 – Right to be Forgotten II, paras 42 et seq. 
and paras 53 et seq.
60 Ibidem, paras 60 et seq.
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the Basic Law.61 In this case, the First Senate of FCC decided to directly 
apply EU fundamental rights as the standard of review in constitutional 
complaint proceedings.
Another question that arose when dealing with fully harmonized EU 
law is whether German courts and authorities observed the require-
ments deriving from EU fundamental rights in that individual case. The 
FCC cannot entirely refrain from exercising a fundamental rights review 
and rather is called upon to ensure fundamental rights protection on 
the basis of EU fundamental rights. It should be emphasized that in 
European Union Law there is no constitutional complaint procedure 
(unlike in German Law). This means that if the EU fundamental rights 
are now reviewed by the FCC, they can thus themselves be the subject 
of a constitutional complaint under the Basic Law. The FCC explicitly 
condemns the previous approach, in which specialized courts were re-
viewed solely for a violation of their duty to submit a case under Article 
101(1) of the Basic Law.62 The constitutional complaint rather requires 
‘a comprehensive review of fundamental rights […], which also includes 
the correct application of fundamental rights in individual cases’.63 The 
reasoning behind the ruling explicitly emphasizes the need for co-
operation between the ECJ and the FCC in the field of fundamental 
rights.64 The application by the FCC of the fundamental rights under 
the Charter could therefore only be considered ‘if the ECJ has already 
clarified its interpretation or […] is evident’.65 If this is not the case, the 
FCC considers itself to be a court of last instance within the meaning of 
Article 267 TFEU and therefore is obliged to make a submission to the 
ECJ.66 In the case in question, following the approach described above, 
the Court resolved the case on the basis of the Charter. Having estab-
lished that the relevant issues had already been decided by the ECJ67 
and a procedure under Article 267 TFEU was therefore unnecessary, 
the Court weighed the right to respect for private and family life under 
Article 7 of the Charter and the fundamental right to the protection 
of personal data under Article 8 of the Charter against the freedom 
61 Ibidem, Point 2 Key of considerations of the Senate.
62 Ibidem, paras 64 et seq.
63 Ibidem.
64 Ibidem, paras 68 et seq.
65 Ibidem, para. 70.
66 Ibidem, para. 69.
67 In particular, ECJ, judgement of 13 V 2014, Cs. C-131/12 – Google Spain and Google, 
EU:C:2014:317.
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of conducting business under Article 16 of the Charter and the right 
to freedom of expression under Article 11 of the Charter. The Federal 
Constitutional Court could not find any violation of fundamental rights, 
as the TV documentary “Panorama” and its availability on the Internet 
was a permissible use of fundamental rights.
These two judgments also answer the question of whether to apply 
the fundamental rights under the Basic Law or the rights under the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as the standard 
of review. The matter essentially hinges on the distinction between 
fully harmonized EU law and EU law that leaves room for discretion.
Conclusions
The two judgments – ‘Right to be forgotten I’ and ‘Right to be forgot-
ten II’ – have a significant impact on doctrinal and procedural matters. 
With regard to doctrinal consequences, it should be noted that there 
is a new justification for the distinction between the applicability of 
European Union fundamental rights and fundamental rights under the 
German Constitution, although the previous distinction is still valid 
(scope for implementation decisive). The European fundamental rights 
and the German fundamental rights are not strictly separate from each 
other. Indeed, they are intertwined even when public authority in in-
dividual cases can only be measured against one of the catalogues of 
fundamental rights. The Court is clearly seeking to bring the catalogue 
of fundamental rights under the Basic Law closer to that enshrined in 
the Charter. In procedural matters, the recognition of the fundamental 
rights of the Charter as ‘basic rights’ within the meaning of Article 93(1)
(4a) of the Basic Law is probably the most significant innovation. By 
making the institution of constitutional complaint available in matters 
related to fundamental rights under the Charter, the FCC ensures that 
the fundamental rights under the Charter will remain the subject of 
future decisions. This is also likely to have a lasting effect on case law 
in the area of fundamental rights.
It has to be emphasized that the ‘Right to be forgotten II’ judgment in 
particular has implications for the position of the Federal Constitutional 
Court. With the interpretation set out in the judgment, the German 
Constitutional Court empowers itself to shape the Union’s fundamental 
rights and to apply them according to German doctrine. It should also 
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be stressed that through the preliminary ruling procedure, the Federal 
Constitutional Court enters into a dialogue with the ECJ. But there is no 
list of cases in which the FCC had to submit questions to the ECJ. It might 
happen that many marginal cases will provoke debate as to whether 
the German Constitutional Court has decided a question in the area of 
EU fundamental rights, which has not been finally decided by the ECJ, 
meaning that the Federal Constitutional Court should have submitted 
such a question to the ECJ. The question which remains unanswered 
is: to what extent will the FCC make use of the preliminary ruling pro-
cedure to clarify questions of interpretation of the Charter by the ECJ?
But on the other hand, the preliminary ruling procedure allows the 
ECJ and the FCC to enter into a fruitful dialogue that can strengthen 
fundamental rights. The ECJ and national constitutional courts could 
use the dialogue to buttress the position of the fundamental rights 
against the aforementioned threats to freedom. The path taken in the 
‘Right to be forgotten I and II’ decisions has great potential for effective 
common protection of fundamental rights in a multi-level system. It 
is to be hoped that the ECJ and the national constitutional courts will 
make constructive use of this potential.
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS: „THE RIGHT  
TO BE FORGOTTEN I” AND „THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN II” –  
THE EXPECTATION OF INCREASED COOPERATION  
WITH THE CONCURRENT NEED TO MAINTAIN INDEPENDENCE
S u m m a r y
The article discusses the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be for-
gotten II” of 6 November 2019 by the Federal Constitutional Court, which redefine 
the relationship of cooperation between the Federal Constitutional Court and the 
European Court of Justice in the area of fundamental rights. The Court has decided 
for the first time that where EU fundamental rights take precedence over German 
fundamental rights, the Court itself can directly review, on the basis of EU funda-
mental rights, the application of EU law by German authorities. 
In the first part, the article presents the previous system, including the prece-
dence of application of EU law and its exceptions (ultra-vires review; identity review), 
as well as the controversial question of the interpretation of Article 51 (1) of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is decisive for the applicability of the fun-
damental rights under the Charter. The focus is on the constitutional background 
of the German Basic Law for the protection of fundamental rights in the European 
multi-level system. 
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Against this background, the second part of the article presents the facts and 
reasons for the decisions “Right to be forgotten I” and “Right to be forgotten II”. This 
is followed by an analysis of the consequences of these decisions for the protection 
of fundamental rights and cooperation between the European Court of Justice and 
the Federal Constitutional Court. In particular, the way in which fundamental EU 
rights can now be enforced before the Federal Constitutional Court is described 
in greater detail. 
The concluding part provides an overview of the open questions, risks and 
opportunities of this approach. Here the article illustrates the significant impact of 
the two decisions on dogmatic and procedural matters.
Keywords: Right to be Forgotten I – Right to be Forgotten II – precedence of ap-
plication – fundamental rights – cooperation between European Court of Justice 
and the Federal Constitutional Court 
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